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Abstract
With wide deployment of deep neural network (DNN) classifiers, there is great po-
tential for harm from adversarial learning attacks. Recently, a special type of data
poisoning (DP) attack, known as a backdoor, was proposed. These attacks do not seek
to degrade classification accuracy, but rather to have the classifier learn to classify to
a target class t∗ whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test example originally
from a source class s∗. Launching backdoor attacks does not require knowledge of the
classifier or its training process – only the ability to poison the training set with exem-
plars containing a backdoor pattern (labeled with the target class). Defenses against
backdoors can be deployed before/during training, post-training, or at test time. Here,
we address post-training detection in DNN image classifiers, seldom considered in ex-
isting works, wherein the defender does not have access to the poisoned training set, but
only to the trained classifier itself, as well as to clean (unpoisoned) examples from the
classification domain. This scenario is of great interest because e.g. a classifier may be
the basis of a phone app that will be shared with many users. Detection may thus re-
veal a widespread attack. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detection (AD)
∗The authors are with the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park, PA, 16802, USA ({zux49,djm25,gik2}@psu.edu). The last two authors
are also with Anomalee Inc.
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defense against imperceptible backdoor attacks that: i) detects whether the trained
DNN has been backdoor-attacked; ii) infers the source and target classes in a detected
attack; iii) estimates the backdoor pattern itself. Our AD approach involves learning
(via suitable cost function minimization) the minimum size/norm perturbation (pu-
tative backdoor) required to induce the classifier to misclassify (most) examples from
class s to class t, for all (s, t) pairs. Our hypothesis is that non-attacked pairs require
large perturbations, while the attacked pair (s∗, t∗) requires much smaller ones. This is
convincingly borne out experimentally. We identify a variety of plausible cost functions
and devise a novel, robust hypothesis testing approach to perform detection inference.
We test our approach, in comparison with the state-of-the-art methods, for several
backdoor patterns, attack settings and mechanisms, and data sets and demonstrate
its favorability. Our defense essentially requires setting a single hyperparameter (the
detection threshold), which can e.g. be chosen to fix the system’s false positive rate.
1 Introduction
As deep neural network (DNN) classifiers are increasingly used in many applications, includ-
ing security-sensitive ones, they are becoming valuable targets for adversaries who intend
to “break” them. Over the past decade, adversarial learning research in devising attacks
against classifiers and defenses against such attacks has quickly developed [18]. From a
broad view, there are several prominent types of attacks. Test-time evasion (TTE) attacks
induce misclassifications during operation/test-time by modifying test samples in a human-
imperceptible (or machine-evasive) fashion, e.g. [24][22][7][20][34]. Data poisoning (DP)
attacks insert malicious samples into the training set, often to degrade the classifier’s ac-
curacy [12][33]. Reverse engineering (RE) attacks learn the decision rule of a black-box
classifier through numerous queries to the classifier [25][21][29].
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1.1 Backdoor DP Attacks
Recently, a new form of DP attack – a backdoor attack – was proposed, usually1 against
DNN image classifiers [3][8][16][14]. Under such attacks, a relatively small number of legiti-
mate examples from one or more source classes, but containing the same embedded backdoor
pattern and (mis)labeled to a target class, are added to the training set2. Then during test-
ing, the classifier trained on this poisoned training set will likely (mis)classify examples from
those source classes to the target class if the same backdoor pattern is present. The backdoor
pattern, principally designed to be evasive to possible occasional human inspection of the
training set, could be: 1) a human-imperceptible perturbation to clean images [26][14][32];
2) a seemingly innocuous visible object in a scene, e.g. a bird flying in the sky [3][8][31].
Moreover, the perturbation could be applied additively, multiplicatively, or through some
other operation. While we focus on additive perturbations, we will demonstrate our ap-
proach is also effective for other perturbative mechanisms, without requiring knowledge of
the mechanism used. What makes backdoor attacks attractive is that successful attacks will
not degrade the classifier’s accuracy on clean examples. Thus, validation/test set accuracy
degradation that could be observed for a classical DP attack cannot be reliably used as a
basis for detecting backdoor attacks. Moreover, launching backdoor DP attacks only requires
the ability to poison the training set (with a relatively modest number of poisoned training
samples) – no knowledge of the classifier (or some trained surrogate classifier with similar
classification performance) is required, unlike for a TTE attack. The attacker’s poisoning
capability is facilitated by the need in practice to obtain “big data” suitable for accurately
training a DNN for a given domain – to do so, one may need to seek data from as many
sources as possible (some of which could be attackers). Since backdoor attacks require less
attacker knowledge and capabilities than e.g. TTE attacks, they are a serious practical
threat to the integrity of deployed machine learning solutions. Note also that detection de-
fenses that have been developed for TTE attacks, e.g. [17], do not have obvious applicability
for detecting backdoor attacks – these two attacks are very different.
1Backdoor attacks could also be launched against a speech recognizer [16] or text classifier [5].
2The source class(es), the target class and the backdoor pattern are all decided by the attacker.
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1.2 Three Defense Scenarios
While backdoor attacks on DNN classifiers appeared only fairly recently, several defenses have
been proposed aiming to detect and mitigate them [26][2][15][32][28][31]. We identify three
defense scenarios. The first is before/during-training, where the defender has access to the
(possibly poisoned) training set and either to the training process or to the trained (attacked)
classifier. The defender’s goal in this setting is to detect whether the training set has been
poisoned by a backdoor or not. If the training set was poisoned, the malicious examples
should be identified and removed before classifier training (or retraining)3. Recently proposed
backdoor defenses (e.g. [26][2][32]) for this case first train a network using the potentially
poisoned training set and then investigate the distribution of feature vectors produced e.g.
at the penultimate layer of the DNN, for each class. If a target class has been attacked, the
penultimate layer feature vectors for the backdoor patterns should be distinct (separable)
from the clean samples from this class. Among existing works, a state-of-the-art defense [32]
first clusters the feature vectors from each class into a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)-
selected [23] number of mixture components; then the components are separately evaluated
(for possible removal from the training set) according to a “cluster impurity” measure.
The second defense scenario is “in-flight”, where backdoor detection is performed during the
classifier’s use/operation, when it is presented with a test example. The defender’s goal is to
detect potential backdoor patterns, possibly identify the entity making use of the backdoor,
and trigger an alarm [18]. To our knowledge, no existing works have devised defenses against
backdoors for this scenario.
This paper focuses on the third scenario, post-training, where the defender has access to the
trained DNN but not to the possibly backdoor-poisoned training set used for its learning.
We also assume that an independent clean data set is available (no backdoors present) with
examples from each of the classes from the domain [15][28][9]. Note that this independent
set is not the clean training set – it is whatever labeled examples from the domain that
the defender has access to. Availability of such data in practice is reasonable – it is not a
3It is additionally useful to determine the source and target classes involved in the detected backdoor.
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strong assumption4. The post-training scenario is of strong practical interest because DNN
training can be extremely computationally intensive; hence learning may be outsourced to
a third party who may be compromised [8]. Moreover, there are many pure consumers of
machine learning systems – e.g., an app used on millions of cell phones. The app user will
not have access to the training set on which the app’s classifier was learned. Still, the user
would like to know whether the app’s classifier has been backdoor-poisoned. The user may
reasonably possess clean labeled data on which, e.g., it can evaluate the performance of
the DNN. Consider also legacy classifier systems, for which the training data may be lost
or inaccessible. Since the attacker seeks for the backdoor mapping to be learned without
affecting the classifiers accuracy on clean (backdoor-free) samples, such attacks may be
inherently evasive. As the user/defender, our fundamental goal is to detect whether the
DNN has been backdoor-attacked or not, using only the independent clean data set. If
attacked, the DNN should be discarded and replaced by a new one from a more trustworthy
source. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Beyond that, we also aim to infer the source class(es)
and the target class of the detected backdoor attack. Additionally, we aim to estimate the
backdoor pattern itself, given that an attack has been detected. The backdoor could be
mitigated if the DNN is fine-tuned using a (sufficient number of) clean examples with the
estimated backdoor pattern added in (and labeled with the correct source class – not the
backdoor’s target class). Such tuning may “unlearn” the backdoor. If such tuning is not
practical, the estimated backdoor pattern may still help to detect and thus reject use of the
backdoor operationally, i.e. “in-flight”. This may be considered in our future work.
1.3 Proposed Anomaly Detection Framework
In this paper, we propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detection (AD) approach thwart-
ing backdoor attacks post-training. Note that there is sufficient interest in post-training
backdoor detection that it is the subject of a recent IARPA BAA [27]. While this BAA
allowed detector solutions to make use of supervised exemplar DNN classifiers (“with back-
door present”, and “without backdoor”), such labeled information is unrealistic in practice
4For example, there may be two databases available for dog breed classification. If database A is used for
classifier learning, database B can be used as the independent data set by the defender.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the post-training scenario. The user/defender receives a classifier
trained on a possibly (backdoor) poisoned training set from the training authority. An
independent clean data set is used to detect whether the classifier is backdoor attacked. If
a detection is made, the classifier is discarded; else, it is certified for use.
and is not needed by our AD approach. Here we mainly focus on detecting attacks with
imperceptible backdoor patterns that are additive perturbations – imperceptible effectively
means that the perturbations are small, as measured by some norm metric. Small perturba-
tions are invisible to humans and at the same time not so readily machine-detected. We will
also demonstrate that imperceptible backdoors with other perturbative mechanisms can be
effectively detected by a slight generalization of our AD approach. Post-training detection
for perceptible backdoor patterns, i.e. visible objects innocuous to the scene, is studied in
[31]. Our detector, though targeting backdoor DP attacks, is inspired by an observation
made about TTE attacks: for a DNN trained on a clean training set, for any (s, t) ∈ C × C
(source, target) class pair, with C the class set, altering the class decision for every image
from class s to class t using the same additive perturbation requires much larger perturbation
size/norm than for altering a single image’s decision from class s to class t [19]. However,
if there is a class pair (s∗, t∗) involved in devising a backdoor attack with an imperceptible
backdoor pattern, there should be a perturbation that is very modest in size/norm and yet
which when added to all examples from class s∗ induces the DNN to change the decision
to class t∗ for most of them – the backdoor pattern5 itself is one such perturbation. Thus,
our AD defense is devised by seeking for each (s, t) class pair the minimal-size/norm per-
turbation that induces a significantly high fraction (no less than some pi ∈ (0, 1]) of group
5As shown in Section 5.3.4, when the backdoor pattern has large perturbation size/norm but is still
human-imperceptible, there exists a perturbation with much smaller size/norm containing sufficient features
of the true backdoor pattern (e.g. similar pattern but with smaller size/norm) that could still induce high
group misclassification for the (source, target) class pair prescribed by the attacker.
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misclassifications from class s to class t. This is captured mathematically by the following
constrained optimization problem:
minimize
v
d(v)
subject to
1
|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds
1(f([x+ v]c) = t) ≥ pi,
(1)
where d(·) is the metric for measuring the size (L1 norm) or the energy (squared L2 norm)
of a perturbation v, [·]c represents a clipping operation6 to ensure pixel intensities stay in
the allowed range, f(·) is the classifier’s decision, and Ds is the set of clean patterns from
class s. Also, 1(·) is an indicator function whose value is 1 when the enclosed event occurs,
and 0 otherwise.
This optimization effectively aims to reverse-engineer a possible backdoor pattern. The
size/norm of the obtained perturbations for all class pairs then go through our hypothesis-
test-based detection inference and a resulting order statistic p-value is derived to make
detections with any user-preferred confidence level. Compared with other related works that
will be reviewed in Section 4, our defense does not make assumptions about the number
of source classes involved in the potential backdoor attack. Also, we do not constrain the
shape, location, or spatial support of the backdoor pattern, unlike existing approaches. We
will show the effectiveness of our defense for different backdoor patterns, data sets (in the
supplementary material), and attack settings, through large-scale experiments in Section
5. We will also discuss several variants of the basic objective function we use for learning
the perturbations, our choice of decision statistics and detection inference strategy, design
choices, and computational complexity.
1.4 Summary of Our Contributions
1) We develop one of the first methods (and an approach superior to [28] and [15], as shown
in Section 5.2.2 and the supplementary material, respectively) for detecting backdoor attacks
on DNNs post-training, i.e. without the benefit of the poisoned training set, and also without
the benefit of additional unrealistic information such as supervised labeled examples of DNNs
with and without backdoors [27].
6The clipping operation is an alternative to imposing strict box constraints on the backdoor pattern [24].
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2) Our AD detection approach is related to TTE attack approaches, except in two key
respects: i) Instead of inducing misclassification of a single image, we seek a (small) per-
turbation that induces misclassification of an entire group (class, or subset of classes) to a
target class; ii) the gradient optimization based search for such perturbations is performed
as part of an AD defense, rather than as part of an attack.
3) We formulate a novel, principled, robust detection inference approach based on the per-
turbation size/norm statistics produced for all (s, t) ∈ C × C pair hypotheses. Moreover,
we extend our approach to account for class confusion information – this allows us to reli-
ably distinguish backdoor attacks from class pairs that merely possess naturally high class
confusion.
4) We perform extensive experiments comparing against alternative defenses on several im-
age databases, under different attack scenarios (single pairs, multiple source classes and
one target class), and for different backdoor patterns ranging from a single pixel mask to a
global image mask. Our approach is found to be highly effective at detecting attacks, and
superior to other methods, across these experiments. We further elucidate reasons why our
approach achieves superior results to existing methods. We also make some novel experimen-
tal observations about DNN “generalization” induced by backdoors (a “collateral damage”
phenomenon).
5) We give a proof of concept that our approach can be made robust to the mechanism for
introducing backdoor patterns and need not assume, e.g., that the backdoor perturbation is
additive. Our approach is also effective if the unknown attack is multiplicative or involves
local patch replacement [28].
2 Threat Model
2.1 Notation
Denote the DNN classifier to be examined for backdoor attacks as f(·) : X → C, where X is
the input (image) space and C = {c1, . . . , cK} is the set of class labels. The classifier uses a
“winner take all” rule. For example, for the commonly used softmax activation function in
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the output layer of DNN classifiers, the predicted label of an image x ∈ X is
f(x) = arg max
c∈C
p(c|x).
where p(c|x) is the a posteriori probability of class c ∈ C. We also denote the clean labeled
set used for detection as D, which has a partition D = ∪c∈CDc, where Dc contains all images
labeled by c7.
2.2 Background on Backdoor Attacks
A backdoor attack is launched with a (set of) source class(es) s∗ ∈ C (S∗ ⊂ C for multiple
source classes), a target class t∗ ∈ C with t∗ 6= s∗ (t∗ /∈ S∗ for multiple source classes), and a
backdoor pattern v∗, all prescribed by the attacker. Like most related works, we assume a
single target class and a single backdoor pattern for each attack for simplicity [28, 9, 26, 32].
But we allow backdoor attacks to have any possible number of source classes (ranging from
1 up to (K−1), for |C| = K legitimate classes). Although more source classes may make the
attack less evasive in practice, we investigate the multiple source class case to demonstrate
the detection capability of our AD framework under general attack settings.
In this work, we consider an imperceptible backdoor pattern v∗ with the same dimensionality
as the input image. Practical backdoor patterns can also be human-perceptible but seemingly
innocuous objects (e.g. a bird in the sky, a pair of glasses on a face [3]); however, the scene-
plausibility of such backdoors is highly dependent on the image domain. Such backdoor
attacks may also require much more crafting effort8. The defense developed in this paper
is not intended to detect backdoors based on innocuous, perceptible patterns – detection of
such backdoors is addressed in [31].
An imperceptible backdoor pattern can be embedded into a clean image x as an additive
7If D is unlabeled, we can instead define Dc as the set of images in D classified by the DNN to c. Assuming
the classifier’s error rate for class c is low, this set will be a good surrogate for the images truly from class c.
8Large crafting effort would not be required if the backdoor involves simply putting glasses on a face –
however, such a backdoor might also be rejected by the security protocol of a face recognition system (no
glasses allowed). Moreover, one might discover the backdoor by accident, simply by (innocently) putting on
a pair of glasses and noticing the change in the classifier’s decision.
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perturbation ([26, 32, 14, 1]), by
Badd(x, v
∗) = [x+ v∗]c, (2)
where the clipping operation [·]c constrains the pixel intensity values to their valid range (e.g.
[0, 255] for a gray scale intensity). Backdoor patterns shown to have good imperceptibility
and attack effectiveness include “global” patterns with large ||v∗||0 but very small ||v∗||2
[14, 1, 3], and “local” patterns with small ||v∗||0 (i.e. perturbing only few pixels) and modest
||v∗||2 [26, 32].
Our AD framework does not make any assumptions about the shape, location, or spatial
support of the backdoor pattern – it detects attacks with either global or local impercep-
tible backdoor patterns, as shown by our experiments. Moreover, while we mainly focus
on additive perturbations (embedded by Eq. (2)) in our experiments, we also show that
our generalized AD framework can effectively detect attacks with other perturbative mech-
anisms (see Section 5.2.3). Finally, we do not consider finite precision effects in this work,
associated with very low bit rate (compressed) representation of images, i.e. we allow v∗ij,
the perturbation for pixel (i, j), to be any real number in the valid range and likewise the
clipped version of xij + v
∗
ij can be any real number in the valid range.
2.3 Attacker’s Goals, Knowledge, and Assumptions
The goal of backdoor DP attackers is to induce the classifier to learn to misclassify samples
that ground-truth come from the source class s∗ (or any class c ∈ S∗) to the target class
t∗ whenever the attacker’s chosen backdoor pattern v∗ is embedded to an original image
from class s∗. This is achieved by poisoning the classifier’s training set with examples from
class s∗ that are (e.g. additively) perturbed with the backdoor pattern and mislabeled as
originating from class t∗. The attack is evaluated by the attack success rate on a test set of
patterns from class s∗ with the backdoor pattern v∗ added to each such test example. Also,
the test accuracy on clean (backdoor-free) samples should not be degraded. In addition,
the devised attack should be evasive, such that the backdoor patterns are both difficult to
machine-detect and difficult for a human to perceive (in case there is human training set
inspection). The knowledge and capabilities of backdoor attackers that are assessed in this
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work are as follows:
1) The attacker has full knowledge of the legitimate image domain and access to the training
set. Thus, the attack can be launched by simply adding a backdoor pattern to relatively few
legitimate images from s∗ (or several classes not including t∗), labeling them as coming from
t∗, and inserting them into the training set. At test time, the attacker can then add the
backdoor pattern to an image from s∗ and, with high probability, elicit a classifier decision to
t∗. Although such attacks do not truly require knowledge about the classifier or the training
process, we will endow the attacker with this knowledge. In particular, with this knowledge
the attacker can replicate the training process using different candidate backdoor patterns.
The one with lowest perturbation size/norm9 among those with an acceptable attack success
rate and negligible degradation in test accuracy on clean samples is then chosen for the
actual backdoor attack – in this way, the attacker seeks the least human-perceptible attack
(using perturbation size/energy as a surrogate for perceptibility).
2) The attacker has no specific knowledge about any defenses that may be deployed to
detect the attack. However, the attacker does know that the backdoor pattern should be
human-imperceptible.
2.4 Defender’s Goals, Knowledge and Assumptions
In this paper, we play the role of a defender who aims to detect backdoors in trained networks
with low false positives and to infer the true source class(es) and target class. An additional
goal is to estimate the backdoor pattern, which can possibly be used to mitigate the attack
as discussed in Section 1. The capabilities possessed by the defender are:
1) The defender possesses an independent labeled, clean data set with images from all classes
(i.e. D), but does not have access to the (possibly poisoned) training set used to design the
classifier. This unavailability of the training set is what distinguishes post-training detection
from before/during-training detection. This also makes post-training detection both an
9Perturbations with small size/norm are not only imperceptible to humans. In [18] and [32], such back-
door patterns are experimentally shown to be evasive to several existing backdoor defenses (before/during-
training) that are very successful against human-perceptible backdoor patterns [2][26].
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interesting and challenging problem, as any information about a possible backdoor is only
latently available in the learned DNN weights.
2) The defender has full access to the classifier, but no training/retraining (using the available
clean data set) is allowed. Such retraining on clean data would of course remove the learned
backdoor. However, the clean data set available to the user will generally be too small
to adequately retrain the classifier and/or the user may have inadequate computational
resources for such retraining.
3) The defender assumes only that the attack, if present, involves a single target class and
that the attacker will seek to make the backdoor human-imperceptible. No knowledge of the
backdoor pattern, the number of source classes, the label(s) of the source class(es) or the
label of the target class are available to the defender. For much of this work, the backdoor
pattern is additively applied and this is known to the defender. However, we will also show
an effective detector can be devised for more general attack mechanisms (e.g., multiplicative
perturbations), and without requiring knowledge of the perturbative mechanism used by the
attacker.
3 Detection Methodology
3.1 Proposed Detector: Reverse-Engineering the Attack
3.1.1 Key Idea
As noted earlier, the premise behind the proposed AD framework is that for a classifier
that has been backdoor data poisoned with source class s∗ and target class t∗, the required
perturbation size for a common perturbation to induce misclassification to t∗ for most images
from class s∗ is much smaller than for class pairs that have not been backdoor-poisoned –
in fact, one such common perturbation (it need not be unique) is the backdoor pattern v∗
itself. Thus, if one can find a small perturbation that induces most patterns from s to be
misclassified to t this is indicative that the DNN is the victim of an (imperceptible) backdoor
attack involving the class pair (s, t).
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In our detection scenario, for each class pair (s, t) ∈ C×C, we estimate the optimal perturba-
tion v∗st that induces at least pi-level group misclassification as the solution to (1) in Section
1.3. pi ∈ (0, 1] can be considered the minimum misclassification rate to deem a backdoor
attack “successful” – e.g. we might set pi = 0.8. The choice of pi does not have strong effect
on our detection performance because the required perturbation size for a true attack pair
(s∗, t∗) is observed to be anomalously small, compared with the size for non-attack class
pairs, over a large range of pi values, as will be shown in Section 5.3.1. In practice pi can be
set by the user.
Our detection procedure consists of two steps. First, we estimate v∗st for each class pair
(s, t) ∈ C × C, s 6= t. Second, an inference procedure is performed based on the collection
of statistics {d(v∗st)} for ∀(s, t). If the classifier is attacked and the backdoor involves, for
example, a single (source, target) class pair (s∗, t∗), we would expect d(v∗s∗t∗)  d(v∗st) for
all (s, t) 6= (s∗, t∗). If the network has not been attacked, we would expect there are no such
anomalies. Our actual inference procedure is detailed in Section 3.1.3.
3.1.2 Perturbation Optimization
Unfortunately, (1) does not have a closed-form solution and cannot be solved using gradient-
based methods because of the non-differentiable indicator function. Hence, instead we choose
the perturbation to minimize a surrogate objective function. Note that choosing a perturba-
tion to induce group misclassification is quite reminiscent of optimization of a parameterized
classification model to maximize the correct classification rate. Further, note that there is no
singular objective function used in practice for learning good classifiers – cross entropy, dis-
criminative learning that seeks to minimize a soft error count measure [13], classifier margin,
as well as other training objectives [6] have all been shown to be “good” surrogate objectives
for the (non-differentiable) classification error rate in that minimizing them to determine
the classifier leads to good (test set) classification accuracy in practice. Similarly, there are
multiple plausible surrogate objectives for (1). While in Section 3.2 we discuss various al-
ternatives, in our experiments we have primarily optimized the perturbation (i.e. estimated
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putative backdoors) by performing gradient descent on the objective function
Jst(v) = − 1|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds
p(t|[x+ v]c), (3)
until the constraint in problem (1) is satisfied. The algorithm is summarized below.
Algorithm 1 Perturbation Optimization
1: Initialization: v ← 0, ρ← 1|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds 1(f(x) = t)
2: while ρ < pi do
3: v ← v − δ · ∇Jst(v)
4: ρ← 1|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds 1(f([x+ v]c) = t)
There are several things to note about Algorithm 1. First, ρ is updated in each iteration as
the misclassification fraction induced by the current perturbation v. Second, note that we
do not explicitly impose a constraint on the perturbation size – the perturbation is initially
set to zero, with its size tending to grow with iterations. While a smaller-sized perturbation
inducing pi-level misclassification could be achieved by minimizing Jst(·) subject to an explicit
constraint on the perturbation size10, this would also lead to an optimization problem that
would require the choice of a Lagrange multiplier specifying the value of the constraint –
appropriate (likely search-entailed) choice of the Lagrange multiplier would complicate this
constrained optimization problem. In practice, we have found that gradient descent on
Jst(·) with termination once pi-level misclassification is achieved yields small perturbations
for backdoor pairs relative to those required for non-backdoor pairs. This is sufficient for
successful anomaly detection of backdoor pairs. Third, we recognize that the gradient of
Jst(·) has non-zero contributions from samples even once they are successfully misclassified.
Again, we do not claim that Jst(·) is the best surrogate for misclassification count that
could be used. While we have found it to be quite effective, several surrogate functions are
identified in Section 3.2, and can instead be used, within our detection framework. Fourth,
δ is the step size for updating v. If δ is too small, the execution time can be very long. If
δ is too large, the algorithm may terminate in a few steps with a resulting ρ much larger
than pi and with the resulting perturbation much larger in size/energy than that required to
induce pi-level group misclassification. In practice, a suitable δ can be chosen via line search.
10Or by minimizing the perturbation size subject to a level of Jst(·).
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Fifth, in our actual implementation, we set an upper bound on the size/energy of v, with
the algorithm terminated when the upper bound is reached even if the pi target has not been
reached – when pi is selected too large (e.g. pi = 1), looking for the required perturbation
may be hard or even infeasible (even for a ground-truth attacked pair (s∗, t∗)).
3.1.3 Detection Inference
The statistics for the detection inference are {rst}, where rst = d(v∗st)−1, i.e. the reciprocal
of the “size” of the K(K − 1) optimized perturbations (one for each class pair). d(·) can
e.g. be the L1 norm or L2 norm. We take the reciprocal because otherwise anomalies
(corresponding to (s∗, t∗) or (s, t∗) for ∀s ∈ S∗), if they exist, will be near the origin. The
null hypothesis for our detection inference is that the classifier has not been attacked, which
requires the K(K−1) detection statistics to follow a null distribution (i.e. a distribution for
non-backdoor attack pairs). Alternatively, if the classifier has been attacked, the reciprocal
statistics corresponding to the class pairs involved in the attack should be large anomalies,
with small p-values under the null. Hence our detection inference for each classifier consists
of the following two steps: i) estimating a null distribution for non-backdoor class pairs; ii)
evaluating whether the largest detection statistic, which is the one most likely associated
with a backdoor attack, is very unlikely under the null distribution.
The null parametric density form used in our detection experiments is a Gamma distribution,
a right-tailed distribution with positive support. We note that other one-tailed distributions,
e.g. exponential distribution, inverse Gaussian distribution, etc., can also be used as the null
distribution within our approach. Because we assume that there is at most one target
class, if there is a backdoor attack, there can be at most K − 1 reciprocal statistics that
correspond to backdoor attack class pairs. Thus, we consider the K(K − 1) − (K − 1) =
(K − 1)2 smallest reciprocals (corresponding to the (K − 1)2 optimized perturbations with
the largest size/energy) and assume that these are not associated with backdoor attacks
and thus are suitable for use in learning the null density function. We exclude the (K − 1)
largest reciprocals from being used for such estimation because these could be associated
with the backdoor attack and thus could corrupt estimation of the null model, as will be
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shown experimentally in Section 5.3. However, one should not simply naively learn a null
density using the (K − 1)2 smallest reciprocal statistics. Note that it is unknown which, if
any, of the (K− 1) largest reciprocals correspond to a backdoor – there may be no backdoor
attack on the network. Thus, it is incorrect to assume there are no null measurements in
the interval rmin < r < rmax, where rmin is the smallest of the (K− 1) largest reciprocals and
rmax is the largest of these statistics – some of these (K − 1) statistics could correspond to
class pairs not involved in a backdoor attack and follow the true null distribution. Even if
we do not use these observed statistics to estimate the null, we should not implicitly assume
there are no null measurements in this interval. To account for this lack of certainty, we
should use the (K − 1)2 smallest statistics to learn the conditional null density, where we
condition on these statistics being less than rmin. That is, we condition on the observed
statistics being smaller than the smallest of the (K − 1) statistics that could correspond to
a backdoor attack. Thus, we use the (K − 1)2 smallest statistics to learn the conditional
null density gR(r|r < rmin) by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Once we estimate this
conditional density, its parameters then uniquely determine the corresponding unconditional
null density gR(r). That is, gR(r) = gR(r|r < rmin)·prob[R < rmin], r ≥ 0. To our knowledge,
this is a novel robust density modeling approach we are proposing. In Section 5.3.3, we will
demonstrate the superiority of this learned null model, compared with the naive null obtained
by directly estimating the (unconditioned) null distribution using all the K(K−1) reciprocal
statistics.
Given this learned null, we then ascertain if any of the K(K − 1) reciprocals deviate from
the null. In particular, we evaluate the probability under the null that the largest of these
K(K− 1) reciprocals is greater than or equal to the observed maximum reciprocal, rmax, i.e.
pmax := probnull[max{R1, . . . , RK(K−1)} ≥ rmax]
= 1− probnull[max{R1, . . . , RK(K−1)} ≤ rmax]
= 1−GR(rmax)K(K−1)
(4)
where GR(·) is the null cumulative distribution function. If this order statistic p-value is
less than a threshold θ, the null hypothesis is rejected and the classifier is claimed to be
attacked. Since p-values under the null hypothesis are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], θ can
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in principle be set to fix the false detection rate. For example, the “classical” statistical
significance threshold θ = 0.05 should induce 5% false detections for classifiers not attacked.
If an attack is detected, the class pair corresponding to rmax is inferred to be involved in
the backdoor attack. Furthermore, if the attack is detected, the optimized perturbation for
the detected pair is our estimation of the backdoor pattern v∗ used by the attacker. The
complete detection procedure (which fits into the “Backdoor detection” block in Figure 1),
including this robust null learning and inference strategy, is summarized pictorially in Figure
2. Note that in [30], we proposed a different order statistic inference approach, which is also
shown to be quite effective.
Figure 2: Flow chart for our complete detection procedure.
3.2 Surrogate Objective Function Variants
As noted above, Jst(·) measures a non-zero gradient contribution even from samples already
successfully misclassified. This can be remedied by instead minimizing an objective function
similar to that associated with the Perceptron algorithm [6]:
Jst−p(v) = − 1|Dˆs(v, t)|
∑
x∈Dˆs(v,t)
p(t|[x+ v]c), (5)
where Dˆs(v, t) = {x ∈ Ds : f([x+ v]c) 6= t}.
Another potential concern with Jst(v) in Eq. (3) is the use of all images from source class s
for perturbation optimization – if the attacker knows the training set and training approach,
he/she can mimic (clean) classifier training and identify the training samples from s that
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are misclassified. It is possible the attacker will exclude these samples from consideration
in crafting the backdoor. Accordingly, to mimic the attacker, the defender might consider
group misclassification only on the subset of clean source samples that are correctly classified.
This leads to the following objective:
Jst−c(v) = − 1|Dˆs|
∑
x∈Ds,f(x)=s
p(t|[x+ v]c), (6)
where Dˆs = {x ∈ Ds : f(x) = s}. One can also combine the restrictions in (5) and (6),
summing only over x such that both f([x+ v]c) 6= t and f(x) = s.
Likewise, one might also hypothesize the attacker used box constraints [24], rather than
clipping, in implementing the backdoor to keep image intensity values in the proper range.
If so, the defender might modify the above surrogate problems for box constraints, rather
than clipping.
As noted before, one could also consider an optimization problem that explicitly accounts
for/constrains the perturbation size. Moreover, one can use a soft error count/discriminative
learning objective function akin to that used in [13].
Based on this discussion, one can see that many surrogative objective function variants are
possible. In Section 5, we experiment with some of these alternative surrogates; however,
in general we have found that detection performance is not sensitive to this choice. Again,
the reason is that all that is needed is that the size of the learned perturbation for a true
backdoor pair (s∗, t∗) should be much smaller than for a non-backdoor pair. Minimizing
any of these surrogate objectives is sufficient to elicit this difference between rs∗t∗ and rst,
(s, t) any non-backdoor pair. While our experiments primarily focus on minimizing Jst(·),
our detection framework is general and consistent with use of any of the above alternative
surrogates, in the search for minimal-sized image perturbations.
3.3 Correction for Class Confusion
The premise behind our detection inference is that the perturbation size/energy required to
induce pi-level group misclassification for (s∗, t∗) is less than for other (unattacked) class pairs.
However, if the initial misclassification fraction ρ
(0)
st for (s, t) 6= (s∗, t∗) is abnormally high, it
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is expected that the perturbation size/energy needed to reach pi-level group misclassification
will be smaller than when this initial misclassification fraction is low, i.e. d(v∗st) may be
abnormally small, possibly resulting in (s, t) being falsely detected.
Figure 3: An example of correction of perturbation sizes to account for non-zero initial class
pair confusion.
Here we suggest to correct this effect assuming the confusion matrix information is available
(estimable from the available clean data set). For any pair (s, t) such that ρ
(0)
st 6= 0, we fit
an (M-th order) polynomial using the sequence of (perturbation size/norm, misclassification
fraction) pairs obtained while executing Algorithm 1 for the pair (s, t). This gives a regression
relationship between perturbation size and induced misclassification fraction for the pair
(s, t). The “compensation” d
(0)
st is derived as
d
(0)
st = arg min
d0
min
{am}
T∑
τ=0
[ M∑
m=1
am(d(v
(τ)
st ) + d0)
m − ρ(τ)st
]2
, (7)
where the superscript τ is the index of the iteration when executing Algorithm 1. d
(0)
st is
an estimate of the perturbation size needed to induce the initial class confusion ρ
(0)
st . To
correct for this (non-zero) initial confusion level, we thus add d
(0)
st to d(v
∗
st). Intuitively,
this correction will increase an “abnormally small” d(v∗st), making it less likely to be falsely
detected. Note that d(v
(0)
st ) = 0 since v
(0)
st = 0.
11 T could be chosen as the index of the
last iteration such that either ρ
(T )
st ≥ pi or such that d(v(T )st ) exceeds the upper bound of the
perturbation size/norm. Alternatively, we can base the polynomial fit on a smaller number
11In Algorithm 1, we neglect the subscripts for simplicity.
19
of (perturbation size, misclassification rate) pairs. For (s, t) with ρ
(0)
st = 0, we set d
(0)
st = 0,
i.e. no correction is required in this case.
Figure 3 gives an example of correction to d(v∗st) for one class pair using the confusion
information. The orange dots are the original (perturbation size/norm, misclassification
fraction) sample points obtained from Algorithm 1. The compensation based on an optimized
polynomial with order M = 3 (the blue curve in the figure) is obtained by solving (7). The
blue crosses are the sample points after correction. Note that the polynomial is guaranteed
to pass through the origin, since the purpose of the correction is to ensure that the initial
misclassification rate when there is no perturbation is zero. Then the corrected statistics for
detection inference are {rcst}, where rcst = [d(v∗st) + d(0)st ]−1.
4 Related Work
Few existing works seek to thwart backdoor attacks post-training. Fine-pruning (FP) was
proposed in [15], where the defender prunes neurons in the penultimate layer in increasing
order of their average activations over the clean data set, doing so up until the point where
there is an unacceptable loss in classification accuracy on the clean data set. The premise
behind FP is that backdoor patterns will activate neurons that are not triggered by clean
examples and pruning will likely remove these neurons. However, this premise is not so
plausible in general because there is nothing inherent to gradient-based neural net training
(on a poisoned training set) that would create a propensity for a simple “dichotomization”
of neurons, with most solely dedicated to “normal” operation and some solely dedicated to
implementing the backdoor.
Neural Cleanse (NC) was one of the first post-training detection methods that involves
perturbation optimization and anomaly detection, like our approach [28]. NC assumes that
the backdoor pattern v∗ is embedded into a clean image x by
Bmask(x, v
∗,m∗) = x (1−m∗) + v∗ m∗, (8)
where m∗ is a 2-dimentional, image-wide mask, with values between 0 and 1;  is element-
wise multiplication that applies the mask m∗ (or its “inverse” (1−m∗)) to each channel/color
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of the image. NC further assumes that: 1) the backdoor pattern should have a small spatial
support, i.e. the mask m∗ should have as few non-zero elements as possible; 2) if there is
an attack, all classes except for the target class are source classes. Hence, for each putative
target class t, NC jointly estimates a pattern and a mask using clean images from all classes
except for class t by minimizing the following Lagrangian:
LNC(v,m) = − 1|D \ Dt|
∑
x∈D\Dt
p(t|Bmask(x, v,m)) + λ · ||m||1, (9)
with λ prescribed, until a high misclassification rate to class t from all the other classes is
achieved. Then anomaly detection is performed on the L1 norm of the K estimated masks,
each for a putative target class. An “anomaly index” is derived for each class using median
absolute deviation (MAD) [10]. If for any class t, the anomaly index is greater than a
threshold θMAD = 2, a detection is made with > 95% confidence, with t the target class [28].
Unfortunately, the assumptions made by NC largely limits its usability/performance in prac-
tice. First, an attacker may avoid choosing too many source classes when devising the attack;
otherwise, too many examples with the backdoor pattern will be inserted in the training set,
making the attack less evasive. In Section 5.2.2, we will show that NC fails when there
is a single source class involved in the attack. Second, NC generates K (compared with
K(K − 1) for our approach) statistics for detection inference, such that (assuming a single
target class of the attack) there are only (K−1) “null value realizations” (decision statistics
guaranteed to not be associated with an attack), against which to assess atypicality of the
most extreme statistic. This may lead to an unreliable inference result. Third, as shown by
both our experiments and in [9], when there is no attack, NC can still estimate a pattern
with an abnormally small spatial support for some classes, resulting in a false detection.
Fourth, NC was only experimentally evaluated against perceptible attacks – the noisy back-
door pattern used in their experiments is easy visibly discernible, unlike the imperceptible
backdoor patterns considered in this paper.
A recent extension of NC, named “TABOR”, was proposed in [9]. It focuses on detecting a
very special subset of backdoor patterns located in any one of the four corners of the image.
TABOR assumes that the spatial support of the pattern should be very small and non-
scattered. It also assumes that the backdoor pattern should not cover any key features in the
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image. The (pattern, mask) estimation of TABOR uses the same objective function as NC,
added with regularization terms penalizing any (pattern, mask) that violates its assumptions.
Compared with TABOR (and NC), our AD approach does not constrain the shape, location,
or spatial support of the backdoor pattern. In Section 5, we will show that sparse pixel-wise
perturbations and global, image-wide perturbations with small perturbation size are both
effective as backdoor patterns – our AD detects these attacks with high accuracy.
5 Experiments
5.1 Backdoor Patterns
We first focus on two types of backdoor patterns based on additive image perturbation.
Since pixel values are usually normalized (e.g. from [0, 255] for colored images) to [0, 1]
before feeding to DNN classifiers, the valid perturbation range per pixel (without clipping)
is [−1, 1]. The first type is the sparse pixel-wise perturbation, a backdoor pattern that
affects only a small subset of pixels, as considered in [3][16][2][8][26][28][15][9]. Our pixel-
wise perturbation is created by first randomly selecting a few pixels; for colored images, one
of the three channels (i.e. colors) of each selected pixel is randomly selected to be perturbed.
The perturbations can be either positive or negative, but the perturbation magnitude is
similar, across all the chosen pixels. In our experiments, this was achieved by first fixing a
“reference” perturbation magnitude and then multiplying this reference magnitude for each
of the chosen pixels by a random factor generated by a Gaussian distribution with mean
1 and standard deviation 0.05. The second type of pattern is a global, i.e. image-wide,
perturbation, a backdoor pattern that affects all pixels, akin to a global image watermark
as considered in [3][14][1]. We created a spatially recurrent pattern that looks like a “chess
board” – one and only one pixel among any two adjacent pixels was perturbed (in all three
channels) positively. Again, the perturbation magnitude for each pixel being perturbed is
a fixed value multiplied by a random factor generated from the same Gaussian distribution
mentioned above. Finally, if the L2 norm of the perturbation is specified, we can always
scale the perturbation mask to meet the specification.
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Figure 4: A sparse pixel-wise perturbation mask with L2 norm 0.6 and a 0.5 offset (left),
and a global perturbation mask with L2 norm 10 (right).
Examples of the two types of backdoor patterns for colored images are shown in Figure 4. On
the left, we show the backdoor pattern from one attack realization used in the experiments
in Section 5.2. Four pixels were randomly selected to be perturbed (in one of the three
channels), with the L2 norm12 of the perturbation mask equal to 0.6. For visualization
purpose, a 0.5 offset was added to each pixel of the image. On the right, a global perturbation
mask with L2 norm equal to 10 is shown. However, to launch a successful backdoor attack
with a global backdoor pattern, a perturbation mask with such large L2 norm is unnecessary
– the required norm is in fact smaller than for sparse attacks.
5.2 Ensemble Experiments
In this experiment, we evaluate performance of the proposed defense and some of its variants
(i.e. surrogate objective functions and confusion-corrected detection inference described in
Section 3) based on multiple realizations of classifiers under different attack settings and the
two types of backdoor patterns mentioned above. When doing experiments, we of course
have omniscient knowledge of the classifier and the data poisoning, etc. Thus, as advocated
in [18], we are very careful, in doing experiments, to compartmentalize this knowledge when
implementing the defender and the attacker, so that the defense and attack only exploit
information consistent with their stated assumptions. Our experiment uses the CIFAR-10
data set with 60k color images (32 × 32 × 3) evenly distributed between ten classes. The
data set is separated into a training set with 50k images (5k per class) and a test set with
10k images (1k per class). The DNN classifier uses the ResNet-20 [11] structure with cross-
12There is no strong preference on the norm to be used. L2 norm is the default, unless specified otherwise.
However, we will also evaluate our detection algorithm using the L1 norm.
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entropy training loss. Training is performed for 200 epochs with mini-batch size of 32, using
the Adam optimizer [4], and with training data augmentation (see supplementary material
for details). This training achieves an accuracy of 91% on the clean test set when there are
no backdoor attacks. Note that this data set, DNN structure and training configurations
are frequently used in many adversarial learning works. Experiments on other data sets and
DNN structures can be found in the supplementary material.
5.2.1 Devising Backdoor Attacks
Consistent with our description in Section 2.3, we evaluated perturbations (i.e. the backdoor
pattern) with different L2 norms, and picked the least human-perceptible one (as small L2
norm as possible) under the constraints of high attack success rate and low degradation in
test accuracy on clean patterns. Such evaluation is given in Figure 5. A larger perturbation
norm could be used but at the risk of being perceivable to humans. Also, our detector can
still detect such attacks, as will be seen in Section 5.3.4. For sparse pixel-wise perturbations
and global perturbations, we evaluated L2 perturbation norms ranging from 0.25 to 1.0 and
0.01 to 0.5, respectively. For each L2-norm-specified backdoor pattern, we created a single
attack realization. We produced 1000 attack images using randomly selected13 clean training
images from the ‘automobile’ (source) class, adding the backdoor pattern to each image, and
then clipping as described by Eq. (2). These images (with the backdoor pattern) were
labeled to the ‘truck’ (target) class and added to the training set of 50k clean images. The
poisoned training set was then used to train a DNN classifier. A set of backdoor test patterns
was created by adding the same backdoor pattern to the 1k clean test patterns (those not
used in training) from the source class. The attack success rate is evaluated as the fraction
of backdoor test patterns classified to the target class. Also, the accuracy of the classifier on
the original 10k clean test patterns is evaluated.
As depicted in Figure 5, for the global perturbation backdoor pattern, the attack success
rate grows with the L2 norm of the perturbation mask. However, for the sparse, pixel-wise
13The attacker could alternatively select the images that are easiest to be misclassified to the target class,
based e.g. on the difference in DNN posterior probability between the winning class and the target class.
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Figure 5: Attack success rate (solid) and accuracy on clean test images (dashed) for DNN
classifiers under backdoor attacks that use sparse pixel-wise perturbation (red dots) and
global perturbation (blue squares), for a range of L2 perturbation norms (attack strengths).
backdoor pattern, the attack success rate wildly fluctuates when the perturbation norm is
low, only becoming stable with further increases in the perturbation norm. Such fluctuation
is likely due to the fact that the pixels being perturbed are randomly selected. Consider an
attack realization in which the neighborhood of a perturbed pixel is noisy for most of the
selected images. Such a backdoor pattern might be poorly learned by the classifier. Based
on the results shown in Figure 5, to launch a successful and human-imperceptible attack,
the attacker should choose the L2 norm for the global perturbation mask to be 0.2, with
an attack success rate of 0.959 and test set accuracy of 0.916 on clean test images. For the
sparse, pixel-wise perturbation mask, if the L2 norm is set to 0.6, an attack success rate of
0.993 and test accuracy of 0.914 on clean test images can be achieved.
Based on the randomness in crafting the backdoor patterns and in the training process14, to
evaluate detection performance, we conducted experiments on four groups of DNN classifiers,
25 classifier realizations per group, as follows:
• BD-P-S: Classifiers were trained on the training set poisoned by 1000 backdoor images
with 4-pixel perturbations (||v∗||2 = 0.6). The backdoor images were crafted using
clean images from a single source class.
14In each training iteration, the mini-batch is randomly sampled from the training set. Also, for each
training image, the type of data augmentation is randomly chosen.
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• BD-G-S: Classifiers were trained on the training set poisoned by 1000 backdoor images
with a global perturbation (||v∗||2 = 0.2). The backdoor images were crafted using
clean images from a single source class.
• BD-G-M: Classifiers were trained on the training set poisoned by 900 backdoor images
with a global perturbation (||v∗||2 = 0.2). The backdoor images were crafted using
clean images from the nine classes excluding the target class, with 100 images per
(source) class.
• Clean: Classifiers were trained on the clean training set, without data poisoning.
The four groups of classifiers involve sparse, pixel-wise and global backdoor patterns, single-
source-class and multiple-source-class attack scenarios, and include a clean classifier group.
For each attacked classifier, the clean images used for devising the attack are selected ran-
domly from the ‘automobile’ (source) class, and the backdoor pattern is generated indepen-
dently of the selected images. The attack success rate15 and the clean test accuracy (across
the 25 realizations) for the four groups of classifiers are reported in Table 1 – all backdoor
attacks are successful and the degradation to clean test accuracy is negligible across all ex-
perimental realizations. An example of backdoor images with sparse, pixel-wise backdoor
pattern (Figure 6b), global backdoor pattern (Figure 6c) and the original image (Figure 6a)
are shown in Figure 6. The sparse, pixel-wise backdoor pattern (with L2 norm 0.6) is only
human-perceived through careful visual scrutiny of the image. The global backdoor pattern
(with L2 norm 0.2), when added to the original image, is imperceptible even under care-
ful human inspection, since the perturbation size per pixel (and per channel) is only about
5.1× 10−3.
During the experiments, we noticed that backdoor DP attacks usually induce “collateral
damage” to classes other than s∗ or t∗. That is, supposing the classifier has been successfully
corrupted by a backdoor involving the pair (s∗, t∗), test images from some classes s˜ ∈ C \
{s∗, t∗} will be classified to t∗ with high probability when the same backdoor pattern is
15The attack success rate for the BD-G-M group is evaluated on backdoor images crafted using all 9000
clean test images from the nine classes other than the target class.
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Table 1: Attack success rate and accuracy on clean test images (over all 25 classifier realiza-
tions) for the four groups of DNN classifiers.
Attack success rate Test accuracy
BD-P-S 0.978± 0.035 0.913± 0.003
BD-G-S 0.974± 0.014 0.912± 0.003
BD-G-M 0.990± 0.005 0.912± 0.003
Clean N.A. 0.915± 0.003
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Examples of backdoor patterns applied to CIFAR-10 images: (a) the original
automobile image; (b) automobile with sparse, pixel-wise perturbation (||v∗||2 = 0.6); (c)
automobile with global perturbation (||v∗||2 = 0.2).
added to them. To demonstrate this effect, for each trained DNN in the BD-P-S and BD-G-
S groups, for which only one class is designated to be the source class s∗ of the backdoor, we
conducted eight tests, one for each of the classes (s˜) other than s∗ or t∗. In each test, we added
the backdoor pattern used for attack to the 1000 clean test images from s˜, and obtained a
“class collateral damage rate” as the fraction of images classified to t∗. In Figure 7a and
Figure 7b, we show the histogram of the (8×25 =) 200 class collateral damage rate statistics
for the BD-P-S and BD-G-S groups, respectively. Clearly, significant group misclassification
to the target class is induced for classes other than the true source class using the true
backdoor pattern, for many of the classifiers. This is explained by some classes (s˜) having
patterns that are similar to those of the backdoor’s source class – the backdoor attack is not
sufficiently “surgical” to only induce misclassifications from s∗ to t∗. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that, for such high “collateral damage” classes, the size/energy of the optimized
v∗s˜t∗ is close to the size/energy of v
∗
s∗t∗ . This thus gives further insight into why we exclude
the K − 1 largest statistics in the set {||vst||} from use in estimating the null distribution.
This also helps explain why we only infer a single (source, target) class pair based on the
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(a) BD-P-S group (b) BD-G-S group
Figure 7: Histograms of the collateral damage rate statistics for (a) the BD-P-S group and
(b) the BD-G-S group.
most extreme statistic (as illustrated in Figure 2) – “collateral damage” classes, paired with
the inferred target class, may be prone to false detection, and it is not so easy to distinguish
the “collateral damage” phenomenon for a single source attack from a truly multiple-source
backdoor attack. We do not view this as a true limitation of our detection method – our
method should be able to accurately identify multiple true source classes (using the second
to the (K − 1)-th largest order statistics) if the backdoor attack is more surgical, i.e. if it
does not induce collateral damage to classes not explicitly attacked.
5.2.2 Detection Performance Evaluation
We first evaluate the performance of the proposed AD framework and compare with that of
the NC approach, using the four groups of classifiers. The clean data set used for detection
(for both AD and NC) for each classifier contains 1000 images (100 per class) randomly
sampled from the clean test set held out from training. The combinations of the objective
functions for perturbation optimization and the detection inference strategies to be evaluated
are as follows:
• AD-J-P: Eq. (3) objective combined with the principal detection inference approach.
• AD-Jp-P: Eq. (5) objective combined with the principal detection inference approach.
• AD-Jc-P: Eq. (6) objective combined with the principal detection inference approach.
• AD-J-C: Eq. (3) objective combined with the confusion-corrected detection inference
approach described in Section 3.3.
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• AD-J-P-L1: As the other variants take d(·) to be the L2 norm, this variant is the
same as AD-J-P except using the L1 norm for detection purposes.
For all the variants above, we set pi, the target misclassification fraction, to be 0.8. However,
we have observed that detection performance is not sensitive to the choice of pi (shown
in Section 5.3.1). For the corrected detection inference used with the AD-J-C variant, we
selected the order of the polynomial as M = 3. Again, other choices of M have little impact
on detection accuracy – M = 2, 4, 5 gave similar results. The only remaining hyperparameter
to be selected for all the variants is the detection threshold θ on the p-values. θ can be set
to fix the theoretical false detection rate. Here we use the “classical” statistical significance
threshold θ = 0.05 as the default, which also matches with the choice of NC in terms of
the significance level. We will also evaluate performance for more conservative and liberal
choices of θ later in the current section.
For NC, minimizing (9) requires specifying the Lagrange multiplier λ. We tested both λ = 1.5
and λ = 1.0.16 We conjecture (without testing) that if λ is selected too large, perturbation
optimization for NC may never reach the pi-level group misclassification target. For NC, we
used the same pi = 0.8 target as for the proposed AD framework; we also evaluated pi = 0.5.
However, we found for some classifiers that inducing pi-level misclassification to a subset
of putative target classes from all source classes (i.e. NC’s objective) is not feasible. For
these classes, the optimization process is terminated when the size/norm of the perturba-
tion mask reaches a pre-set upper bound value. When this occurs, the derived detection
statistics for these problematic classes skew estimation of the median during NC inference.
In the experiments, we discarded these abnormal perturbation statistics in order to make
NC inference more robust. For our proposed AD framework, this upper bound on the per-
turbation size/energy was never reached in our experiments – pi-level group misclassification
was always achieved by our method. Even if the upper bound were to be reached for several
class pairs, taking the reciprocal will send these large statistics close to zero and have little
effect on the estimation of the tail of the null density. The variants of NC detection that we
evaluated are:
16The default is λ = 1.5, see “https://github.com/bolunwang/backdoor”.
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• NC-L1-1.5: L1-regularized objective function with λ = 1.5. The anomaly indices are
derived from the L1 norm of each optimized perturbation.
• NC-L2-1.5: L2-regularized objective function with λ = 1.5. The anomaly indices are
derived from the L2 norm of each optimized perturbation.
• NC-L1-1.0: L1-regularized objective function with λ = 1.0.
• NC-L1-1.5-0.5: Same as NC-L1-1.5, except that pi = 0.5 instead of pi = 0.8.
Table 2: Detection accuracy of all the variants of the proposed AD framework (with detection
threshold θ = 0.05) and of the NC approach for the four groups of DNN classifiers for CIFAR-
10.
BD-P-S BD-G-S BD-G-M Clean
AD-J-P 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-Jp-P 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-Jc-P 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-J-C 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-J-P-L1 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
NC-L1-1.5 0.36 0.16 1.00 0.84
NC-L2-1.5 0.56 0.64 1.00 0.72
NC-L1-1.0 0.40 0.28 1.00 0.76
NC-L1-1.5-0.5 0.36 0.16 0.88 0.96
In Table 2, detection accuracy of each variant of the proposed AD and NC detection methods
for each group of classifiers is shown. Accuracy for the groups of classifiers under attack, i.e.
BD-P-S, BD-G-S and BD-G-M, is defined as the fraction of classifiers successfully detected
as attacked. For the proposed AD variants, a successful detection also requires the detected
source and target class pair (corresponding to the most extreme detection statistic) to be
ground-truth involved in the attack. For NC, since it assumes all classes except for the target
class are involved in the backdoor attack, there is no inference on the source class(es). In our
experiments, we thus consider NC detection to be successful if the class label corresponding
to the most extreme anomaly index, if detected (i.e. above θMAD), is the true backdoor
target class label t∗. Thus, for BD-P-S and BD-G-S, our AD approach meets a stronger true
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detection requirement than NC. For the group of clean networks, the detection accuracy is
defined as the fraction of networks inferred to not be attacked.
All proposed AD variants achieved perfect detection for the BD-G-M and Clean group ex-
periments. Detection accuracy for the BD-P-S and BD-G-S groups is also very high (all
above 0.90). We note that we can always make more conservative AD inferences and claim
a successful detection when only the target class is correctly inferred. This is reasonable due
to the collateral damage effect shown previously. Allowing such conservative inference, all
five AD variants achieve perfect detection for the BD-G-S group. In fact, all incorrect source
classes by AD variants for the results shown in Table 2 have high class collateral damage
rate (above 88.4%).
NC detection, as expected, achieves strong performance for the BD-G-M group (except for
the NC-L1-1.5-0.5 variant) since it is designed for backdoor attacks that involve all (K − 1)
source classes. However, all the variants of NC are not effective at detecting backdoor attacks
involving a single source class, as shown in Table 2 by the accuracy for BD-P-S and BD-G-S.
Also, the detection power of NC cannot be improved by choosing a smaller θMAD, since the
false detection rate on clean classifiers is then made quite non-negligible. In Figure 8, we
show the histogram of the maximum anomaly indices for BD-G-S and Clean, obtained using
NC-L1-1.5 – these two groups of anomaly indices are not clearly separable by any choice of
θMAD.
Figure 8: Histogram of the maximum anomaly indices for the BD-G-S and Clean groups,
obtained using NC-L1-1.5.
Unlike NC, for the proposed AD variants, the order statistic p-value for clean classifiers and
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for attacked classifiers are easily separable in practice – there is a large range of thresholds
θ which yield the same (or very similar) performance. In Table 3, we show the detection
performance for a very liberal detection threshold θ = 0.2. We can observe a slight increment
in false detection rate for the Clean group. Simultaneously, the true detection rate for the
BD-P-S group is slightly increased. If we use a very conservative detection threshold θ = 0.01,
as shown in Table 4, only the true detection rate for the BD-P-S group is reduced slightly.
Moreover, we find from Table 2 and Table 3 that the false detection rate for the Clean group
is much lower than its expectation, which equals the detection threshold θ. This is because,
for the classifiers in the Clean group, the distribution of the reciprocal statistics used for
detection is not left-skewed like a typical Gamma distribution – few reciprocals sit on the
tail of the unconditional null distribution. Hence the order statistic p-value follows a slightly
right-skewed distribution rather than a truly uniform distribution on [0, 1]. For example, the
mean of the order statistic p-value across the 25 classifier realizations from the Clean group
is 0.590 when the AD-J-P variant is applied for detection.
Table 3: Detection accuracy of all the variants of the proposed AD framework with detection
threshold θ = 0.2 for the four groups of DNN classifiers.
BD-P-S BD-G-S BD-G-M Clean
AD-J-P 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-Jp-P 0.96 0.92 1.00 0.96
AD-Jc-P 0.96 0.92 1.00 0.96
AD-J-C 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-J-P-L1 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92
Table 4: Detection accuracy of all the variants of the proposed AD framework with detection
threshold θ = 0.01 for the four groups of DNN classifiers.
BD-P-S BD-G-S BD-G-M Clean
AD-J-P 0.84 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-Jp-P 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-Jc-P 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-J-C 0.96 0.92 1.00 1.00
AD-J-P-L1 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
In addition to accurate attack detection inference, our detection approach also gives an
estimate of the ground truth backdoor pattern. The left figure of Figure 9 is an estimate of
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one of the 25 4-pixel perturbations used to create the BD-P-S group. A 0.5 offset is added
for visualization. The ground truth backdoor pattern is the one on the left of Figure 4.
Comparing with the ground truth backdoor pattern, we can see that instead of perturbing
all four pixels, perturbing the region near the ground truth perturbed pixel on the top left
is most effective to induce group misclassification to the target class. The right figure of
Figure 9 is an estimate of one of the 25 global perturbations used to create the BD-G-S
group. Since nearly half of the pixels are perturbed negatively, and the perturbation size is
too small to be visualized, we first add an offset such that the resulting perturbations are
all positive; then the shifted perturbation mask is scaled by 30 times. Clearly, we recover a
“chess board” pattern similar to the ground truth backdoor pattern.
Figure 9: Examples of estimated backdoor patterns with ground truth a 4-pixel perturbation
(left) and a global perturbation (right), respectively. The estimated global perturbation mask
has been scaled by 30 times to be human visualizable.
Finally, we evaluate FP using the classifiers from BD-P-S, BD-G-S and BD-G-M. We demon-
strate the main weakness of FP that there is no simple “dichotomization” of neurons, with
most solely dedicated to “normal” operation and some solely dedicated to implementing the
backdoor. The technical details and the results are deferred to the supplementary material
due to space limitations.
5.2.3 Generalized AD approach
Our AD approach can be easily generalized, without knowledge of the attacker’s mechanism,
to detect imperceptible backdoors with various perturbative mechanisms. Note that most
DNNs f(·) can be decomposed as two consecutive sub-models f1 ◦ f2(·), such that f1(·) :
X → Z maps an image x to its internal layer features z = f1(x) ∈ Z, and f1(·) : Z → C
maps z to the predicted class label. Our AD framework can be generalized, taking AD-J-P
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as an example, by replacing Eq. (3) with the generalized objective function
JGst(v) = −
1
|Ds|
∑
x∈Ds
pG(t|f1(x) + v), (10)
where pG(·|z) is the DNN’s posterior given the internal layer feature vector z. That is, for each
class pair (s, t), we search the minimal-sized perturbation that induces high misclassification
rate from s to t in the internal feature space Z instead of the image space X .
By applying AD-J-P with the generalized objective function Eq. (10), with f1(·) the first
convolutional layer, on the classifiers from the BD-P-S, BD-G-S, and BD-G-M group, we
obtain detection rates 0.88, 1.00, and 1.00, respectively. For the clean group, we detects
no attacks for all the 25 classifiers.
We further consider a multiplicative perturbation u∗ that can be applied to a clean image x
by
Bmulti(x, u
∗) = [x u∗]c,
where u∗ has the same dimension as the image x, with uijk the scaling factor of xijk. Here,
we create a backdoor attack with a multiplicative chessboard pattern – we set uijk = 1 if
pixel xijk is not perturbed and set uijk = 1.02 if pixel xijk is perturbed. Other configurations
of the attack are the same as the attacks on the classifiers in the BD-G-S group.
In Figure 10, we show the histogram of the reciprocal statistics obtained by applying AD-J-P
with the generalized objective function Eq. (10) on the attack above. We again choose f1(·)
as the first convolutional layer. The reciprocals corresponding to the true target classes are
clearly, abnormally large. Our generalized AD successfully detects the attack (with order
statistic p-value 2.0× 10−13  θ = 0.05) with correct inference of the (source, target) class
pair. In the supplementary material, we show that our generalized AD is also effective
for attacks using the local patch replacement backdoor embedding mechanism assumed by
NC (i.e. Eq. (8)). While both generalized and the original additive perturbation AD
approach work well for attacks with multiplicative perturbations, for attacks with the local
patch replacement backdoor embedding mechanism, only the generalized AD approach is
successful.
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Figure 10: Histogram of the reciprocal statistics for AD-J-P with the generalized objective
function applied on an attack with multiplicative chessboard pattern.
5.3 Other Design Choices
5.3.1 Choice of pi
Unlike NC, the proposed detection approach is not very sensitive to the choice of pi. As an
example, we evaluate the detection accuracy of the AD-J-P variant on the 25 classifiers in
the BD-P-S group, with a range of choices of pi from 0.4 to 0.9. We use the default detection
threshold θ = 0.05. As shown in Figure 11, the detection accuracy does increase, but not
dramatically with pi. The minimum detection accuracy across the range of choices of pi is 0.8,
which can be further improved by use of a more liberal detection threshold. This phenomenon
can be understood from Figure 12, in which we plot the sequences of (||v(τ)st ||2, ρ(τ)st ) for all
(s, t) pairs during the perturbation optimization using Algorithm 1 with pi = 0.9, while
applying AD-J-P on an example classifier realization in the BD-P-S group. The sequence
corresponding to the ground truth backdoor class pair (s∗, t∗) is represented using red crosses,
and is clearly separated from the sequences for the non-backdoor pairs. In other words, there
is a huge range for the choice of pi (not exceeding 0.9) to achieve correct detection for this
example. For any choice of pi in such range, the (||v(τ)st ||2, ρ(τ)st ) sequence for each (s, t) pair
is truncated at the minimum τ such that ρ
(τ)
st first exceeds pi. The resulting ||v(τ)st ||2 for the
backdoor class pair (s∗, t∗), as can be seen from the figure, will be much smaller than those
for the non-backdoor pairs, which will lead to a successful detection.
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Figure 11: Detection accuracy of AD-J-P on the BD-P-S group, with a range of choices of
pi.
Figure 12: Sequences of (||v(τ)st ||2, ρ(τ)st ) for all (s, t) pairs, including the ground truth backdoor
pair (s∗, t∗) represented using red crosses, during the execution of Algorithm 1 with pi = 0.9,
while applying AD-J-P on an example classifier realization in the BD-P-S group.
5.3.2 Size of Clean Data Set
Here we test the impact on detection accuracy of the size of the clean data set available to the
defender. Again, we apply AD-J-P detection (with θ = 0.05) to the classifiers in the BD-P-S
group, but with the number of clean images per class used for detection equaling 5, 10, 25,
50, 100 for each trial, respectively. As shown in Figure 13, the detection accuracy increases
as the number of clean images per class grows, approaching a stably high value when the
number of clean images per class is greater than 25. Note that detection accuracy greater
than 80% is achieved with just 10 clean samples per class. Comparing with the size of the
training set (5000 images per class) and the number of backdoor images required to launch
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Figure 13: Detection accuracy of AD-J-P on BD-P-S for a range of sizes of the clean data
set.
the attack (1000 images in total17), the detection cost is “cheap” in terms of the required
number of clean images. Even if there are abundant clean images available to the defender,
he/she can always use only a subset of images to reduce the defender’s computational effort.
5.3.3 Fitting Null Distribution Using All Statistics
As described in Section 3.1.3, during the detection inference process, we fit a conditional null
density using the (K − 1)2 smallest statistics. One may also consider a naive approach that
fits an unconditional null using all detection statistics. In Table 5, we show the detection
accuracy of the AD-J-P variant with detection threshold θ = 0.05 for the four groups of DNN
classifiers based on this naive null learning. Clearly, there is severe degradation in accuracy
of detecting backdoors.
5.3.4 Size/Energy of the Ground Truth Backdoor Pattern
Here we create 25 classifier realizations using the same setting as for the BD-G-S group,
except that the L2 norm of the backdoor pattern is set to 1.2 – much larger than required to
17For backdoor patterns with innocuous objects, poisoning the training set with a few to a few tens of back-
door images yields a successful attack [3]. For backdoor patterns with human-imperceptible perturbations,
hundreds of backdoor images should be used for poisoning the training set to make the attack successful
[26].
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Table 5: Detection accuracy of the AD-J-P variant with detection threshold θ = 0.05 for
the four groups of DNN classifiers, where the null density is estimated using all K(K − 1)
reciprocal statistics.
BD-P-S BD-G-S BD-G-M Clean
detection acc. 0.48 0.44 0.52 1.00
launch a successful backdoor attack (and visualizable by carefully scrutinizing the image).
When applying AD-J-P for detection, with the detection threshold θ = 0.05, the detection
accuracy reaches 1.00. More importantly, the estimated backdoor patterns for the 25 clas-
sifier realizations are all scaled “chess board” patterns with L2 norm around 0.101± 0.017,
while the L2 norm of the optimized perturbation for all non-backdoor class pairs across the
25 realizations is 1.243 ± 0.321. That is, the “estimated” backdoor pattern will have the
minimum norm necessary to achieve the pi target level, even if the actual backdoor pattern
has much larger norm. Regardless, the estimated backdoor pattern is accurate (it is a “chess
board” pattern). Also, from this experiment, we note that the proposed detector does not
require the size/energy of the ground truth backdoor pattern to be significantly smaller than
the size/energy of perturbations required to induce group misclassification for non-backdoor
class pairs.
5.4 Computational Complexity
The computation in this work is performed on an Amazon EC2 g3s.xlarge virtual machines
powered by a NVIDIA Tesla M60 GPU. When applying AD-J-P to the BD-P-S, the average
running time across the 25 classifier realizations is 698s. In comparison, when applying
NC-L1-1.5 to BD-P-S, the average running time across the 25 classifier realizations is 912s.
For both approaches, the perturbation optimization step incurs most of the computational
cost. For the NC defense, each iteration of perturbation optimization requires 2(K − 1)N
back-propagations on the DNN, where N is the number of clean images per class used for
detection. Since NC solves K perturbation optimization problems, the total computational
cost is 2(K−1)NTK back-propagations, where T is the number of iterations required to reach
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pi-level misclassification. For our AD framework, each iteration of perturbation optimization
requires 2N back-propagations on the DNN since we only use clean images from a single
class for detection. The total computational cost is then 2NTK(K − 1) since we solve
K(K − 1) perturbation optimization problems. Theoretically, the computational cost of the
two defenses are the same. But in practice, the difficulty of inducing group misclassification
to a target class from all the other classes can be much higher than inducing misclassification
from a single source class to the target class, especially when the backdoor attack is crafted
with a single source class. Therefore, the number of iterations in perturbation optimization
required for the NC defense is generally larger than that for our proposed defense.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we developed a purely unsupervised AD defense that detects imperceptible
backdoor attacks in DNN classifiers post-training. We tested multiple variants of our AD
framework and compared them with other existing post-training defenses for several backdoor
patterns, data sets (shown in the supplementary material), and attack settings. Our defense
was experimentally shown to be more effective and robust over a range of detection scenarios.
There are several directly related issues that have been considered and can be further ex-
plored. First, although we proposed a correction scheme accounting for class pairs with high
confusion, it is possible for two classes to be very similar but for their confusion to be low. In
such case, the minimum perturbation size required to induce group misclassification for such
class pairs may be as small as for a true backdoor pair. We believe it is possible to devise
an extension of our scheme that can distinguish such false pairs from true ones. Second, our
proposed defense focuses on detecting backdoor attacks with human-imperceptible backdoor
patterns. If the backdoor pattern is an innocuous object in the image (e.g. a tennis ball in a
dog image or glasses on a face), the norm of the backdoor pattern might be much larger than
the average norm of the minimum perturbation required to induce group misclassification
for non-backdoor class pairs. Such backdoors violate our fundamental assumption about
the attacker and require an alternative detection strategy. In fact, we have recently devised
a quite effective approach for this case [31]. Third, applying perturbation optimization at
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an internal layer, in addition to addressing more general backdoor attack mechanisms, also
address other domains – particularly where the inputs to the DNN are discrete-valued (e.g.,
text) and, thus, for which gradient-based optimization of a (continuous-valued) perturbation
cannot be applied. Fourth, backdoor attacks and defenses can be considered for classifiers
other than DNNs, e.g. support vector machines.
There are several other related topics that can be further explored. First, while our cost
function minimization was proposed as part of a backdoor attack detection scheme, it can
also in principle be applied to provide interpretability to existing (unattacked) DNN classifier
solutions. In particular, our approach may identify a class pair (s, t) that is highly confusable
in the presence of an unusually small perturbation. This is revealing of a possible hidden
fragility of the learned classifier. Moreover, it is possible that retraining with an augmented
training set that includes perturbed examples from class s labeled as class s may help to
remedy such fragilities. Second, a defense “in-flight” can be developed to identify backdoor
patterns during the operation of the classifier. For example, the estimated backdoor pattern
revealed by our approach may be used to correlate against test patterns. Third, we can
develop defenses against backdoor attacks while assuming a much stealthier attacker. For
example, the attacker may be able to optimize the backdoor pattern, to make the backdoor
less detectable. Or we may study defenses against “white box” attacks where the attack is
assumed to be aware of the deployed defense. Moreover, a more surgical attack on (s∗, t∗)
may be devised by inserting images crafted using clean images from all classes other than s∗
or t∗, added with the backdoor pattern and correctly labeled, into the training set together
with backdoor images to minimize “collateral damage”.
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